Knaph

Prompt injection

Text inside content an agent reads - a web page, email, file or tool result - that tries to give the agent orders. A model reads instructions and data as one stream of tokens, so it can't be made certain; defences limit what a fooled agent could do, above all by never giving one agent private data, untrusted content and a way to send data out at once.

Depth 1 · Foundation

You can spot where injected instructions can come from, explain why models can't fully resist them, and set an agent up so a fooled one can't do much harm.

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Depths of understanding

  1. 1

    Foundation

    You can spot where injected instructions can come from, explain why models can't fully resist them, and set an agent up so a fooled one can't do much harm.

  2. 2

    Deeper

    You can build it: an agent where text from tools is treated as data, an after-hook that marks content fetched from the web as untrusted, and a design that keeps private data, untrusted content and a way out from meeting in one agent, by splitting the work between agents.

    Master depth 1 first

Your path here

What's still between you and Prompt injection, depth 1, in the order you can learn it.

  1. 1Language modelDepth 1 · Foundation · Language Models
  2. 2AI agentDepth 1 · Foundation · AI Agents
  3. 3TokenDepth 1 · Foundation · Language Models
  4. 4ProbabilityDepth 1 · Foundation · Probability
  5. 5Next-token predictionDepth 1 · Foundation · Language Models
  6. 6Stateless modelDepth 1 · Foundation · Language Models
  7. 7Context windowDepth 1 · Foundation · Language Models
  8. 8System promptDepth 1 · Foundation · Language Models
  9. 9Tool useDepth 1 · Foundation · AI Agents
  10. 10Agent loopDepth 1 · Foundation · AI Agents
  11. 11Agent harnessDepth 1 · Foundation · AI Agents
  12. 12Agent permissionsDepth 1 · Foundation · AI Agents
  13. 13Prompt injectionDepth 1 · Foundation · AI Agents

Where it fits