Prompt injection
Text inside content an agent reads - a web page, email, file or tool result - that tries to give the agent orders. A model reads instructions and data as one stream of tokens, so it can't be made certain; defences limit what a fooled agent could do, above all by never giving one agent private data, untrusted content and a way to send data out at once.
Depth 1 · Foundation
You can spot where injected instructions can come from, explain why models can't fully resist them, and set an agent up so a fooled one can't do much harm.
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- 1
Foundation
You can spot where injected instructions can come from, explain why models can't fully resist them, and set an agent up so a fooled one can't do much harm.
- 2
Deeper
You can build it: an agent where text from tools is treated as data, an after-hook that marks content fetched from the web as untrusted, and a design that keeps private data, untrusted content and a way out from meeting in one agent, by splitting the work between agents.
Master depth 1 first
Your path here
What's still between you and Prompt injection, depth 1, in the order you can learn it.
- 1Language modelDepth 1 · Foundation · Language Models
- 2AI agentDepth 1 · Foundation · AI Agents
- 3TokenDepth 1 · Foundation · Language Models
- 4ProbabilityDepth 1 · Foundation · Probability
- 5Next-token predictionDepth 1 · Foundation · Language Models
- 6Stateless modelDepth 1 · Foundation · Language Models
- 7Context windowDepth 1 · Foundation · Language Models
- 8System promptDepth 1 · Foundation · Language Models
- 9Tool useDepth 1 · Foundation · AI Agents
- 10Agent loopDepth 1 · Foundation · AI Agents
- 11Agent harnessDepth 1 · Foundation · AI Agents
- 12Agent permissionsDepth 1 · Foundation · AI Agents
- 13Prompt injectionDepth 1 · Foundation · AI Agents
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